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Social and Political Transformations in the Middle East	
  
Umit	
  Kurt	
  and	
  Oguz	
  Alyanak
Months	
  ago,	
  the	
   spark	
  that	
  set	
  the	
   body	
  of	
  a	
  young	
   vendor	
  set	
   Tunisia	
   in	
  Kire,	
  which	
  spread	
  all	
  over	
  North	
  Africa	
  
and	
  the	
   Middle	
  East.	
  “Mohammed	
  Bouazizi	
  was	
  the	
  man	
  who	
   set	
   himself	
  and	
  Tunisia	
  on	
  Kire”,	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  
TIME	
  magazine.1	
  (TIME,	
  January	
  21,	
  2011).	
  His	
   self-‐immolation	
  was	
  the	
  beginning	
  of	
  what	
   we	
   speak	
  of	
  today	
  as	
  
the	
  Arab	
  Spring.	
  	
  	
  
The	
  Arab	
   world	
  has	
   been	
  experiencing	
   an	
   inevitable	
   chain	
   of	
  social	
   and	
   political	
   movements	
   that	
   started	
   in	
  
early	
   2011.	
   We	
  believe	
  that	
  the	
  long	
  period	
   of	
   inertia	
  and	
  apathy	
  that	
  pervaded	
  the	
  Arab	
  world	
  has	
  come	
  to	
  an	
  
end.	
  And	
  this	
   belief	
  is	
  the	
  main	
  reason	
  why	
  we	
  carry	
  a	
  series	
  of	
  articles	
  on	
  the	
   Arab	
  Spring	
   to	
  this	
   edition	
  of	
  our	
  
newsletter.	
   Today,	
   thanks	
   to	
   Mohammed	
  Bouazizi,	
   we	
  can	
  speak	
   of	
  courageous	
  of	
  crowds	
   of	
   the	
  Arab	
   world,	
  
from	
  Tunis	
  to	
   Tahrir	
   Square,	
  from	
  Yemen	
  to	
   Bahrain	
  to	
  Benghazi	
   and	
  Tripoli.2	
  What	
  we	
  continue	
   to	
  witness	
  is	
  
truly	
  revolutionary,	
  in	
  the	
  sense	
  that	
  a	
  new	
  order	
  of	
  freedom	
  is	
  emerging	
  in	
  the	
  Arab	
  world.3	
  	
  	
  
Notwithstanding	
  the	
  uprisings	
  have	
  been	
  ignited	
  in	
  all	
  countries	
  having	
  similar	
  economic	
  hardship	
  and	
  absence	
  
of	
  civil	
   and	
  political	
   rights,	
   we	
  should	
  not	
  expect	
  the	
  uprisings	
  to	
  lead	
  to	
  similar	
   changes	
   in	
  all	
  countries.4	
   We	
  
can	
  already	
   speak	
   of	
   three	
  different	
   patterns	
   underlying	
  the	
   motives	
   of	
  resistance.	
   In	
   Tunisia	
   and	
  Egypt,	
   the	
  
presidents	
  have	
  been	
  ruled	
   out	
   by	
  members	
   of	
   their	
  own	
  regime,	
  including	
  the	
  military;	
  they	
  are	
  now	
  trying	
  to	
  
limit	
  the	
  extent	
  of	
  change	
  and	
  to	
   transform	
  a 	
  potentially	
  revolutionary	
   process	
  into	
  one	
  of	
  reform	
   from	
   the	
  top.	
  
In	
  Yemen	
  and	
   Libya,	
   the	
  challenge	
  to	
  the	
  leaders	
  has	
  transformed	
   into	
  a	
   challenge	
  for	
  the	
   survival	
  of	
   the	
   state	
  
itself: the two countries have no institutions	
  that	
  can	
  persist	
  if	
  the	
  presidents	
  are	
  ousted.	
  In	
  other	
  countries	
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affected	
  by	
  protests,	
  the	
  regimes	
  have	
  been	
  trying	
  
to	
   quash	
   the	
   protesters	
   through	
   a	
   mixture	
   of	
  
populist	
  concessions,	
  cautious	
  reforms	
  introduced	
  
from	
  the	
  top,	
  and	
  the	
  occasional	
  use	
  of	
  force.5
	
  	
  
Until	
   very	
   recently,	
   it	
   was	
   often	
   argued	
   that	
   the	
  
political	
  options	
   for	
   the	
  Arab	
  world	
   in	
   the	
  possible	
  
aftermath	
   of	
   the	
   Arab	
   Spring	
   were	
   limited	
   to	
  
three:	
   First,	
  the	
  persistence	
  of	
   corrupt	
  autocracies	
  
as	
   in	
   Egypt	
   and	
   Libya,	
   or	
   royal	
   dynasties	
   as	
   in	
  
S a u d i	
   A r a b i a	
   a n d	
   J o r d a n ;	
   s e c o n d ,	
   t h e	
  
establishment	
   of	
   “Islamic	
   fundamentalisms”	
   and	
  
third,	
   strengthening	
   of	
   al-‐Qaeda’s	
   “terrorism”,	
  
which	
   was	
   sometimes	
   thrown	
   into	
   the	
   same	
  
basket	
  as	
  Islamic	
  fundamentalism.6	
  What	
  this	
   kind	
  
of	
  assessment	
  could	
  not	
  foresee	
   is	
   the	
  emergence	
  
of	
  a	
  movement	
  of	
  mass	
   democratic	
   resistance	
  that	
  
is	
  utterly	
  modern	
  in	
  its	
  understanding	
  of	
  politics.	
  
The	
   uprisings	
   in	
   the	
   Arab	
   world	
   were	
   explained	
  
through	
   two	
   determinants,	
   economic,	
   with	
   mass	
  
unemployment,	
   rising	
   prices,	
   scarcity	
   of	
  essential	
  
commodities	
   and	
   political,	
   cronyism,	
   corruption,	
  
repression,	
   and	
   torture.	
   Egypt	
   and	
   Saudi	
   Arabia	
  
played	
   pivotal	
   roles	
   for	
   the	
   sustenance	
   of	
   U.S.	
  
hegemony	
   in	
  the	
   region,	
   as	
   conKirmed	
  recently	
  by	
  
U.S.	
   vice-‐president	
   Joe	
   Biden,	
   who	
   stated	
   that	
   he	
  
was	
  more	
  concerned	
  about	
   Egypt	
  than	
   Libya.7	
  The	
  
mass	
   movement	
   remains	
   intact	
   in	
   both	
   Tunisia	
  
and	
   Egypt	
   but	
   is	
   also	
   short	
   of	
   the	
   political	
  
instruments	
  that	
  reKlect	
  the	
  general	
   will.8	
  As	
   Tarıq	
  
Ali	
   keenly	
   puts,	
   “the	
   Kirst	
   phase	
   is	
   over	
   and	
  
the	
   second,	
   that	
   of	
   rolling	
   back	
   the	
   movements,	
  
has	
  begun”.	
  
	
  
At	
   this	
   point,	
   it	
   is	
   also	
   crucial	
   to	
   touch	
   upon	
   the	
  
role	
   and	
   effect	
   of	
   Turkey	
   in	
   the	
   region.	
   Clearly,	
  
Turkey’s	
  foreign	
  policy	
   of	
   engaging	
   with	
  different	
  
governments	
   and	
   political	
   groups	
   in	
   the	
   Arab	
  
world	
   has	
   had	
   a	
   transforming	
   impact	
   on	
   Middle	
  
Eastern	
   politics	
   and	
   economy.	
   The	
   Turkish	
  
position	
   on	
   change,	
   as	
   a	
   part	
   of	
   the	
   Foreign	
  
Minister’s	
   “zero	
   problems	
   with	
   neighbors”	
   policy	
  

has	
   been	
   clear	
  all	
  along.	
   Change	
  in	
  the	
  Arab	
  world	
  
is	
   inevitable	
   and	
   must	
   reKlect	
   people’s	
   legitimate	
  
demands	
  for	
  justice,	
   freedom	
   and	
  prosperity.	
   And	
  
change	
   must	
   come	
   without	
   violence.	
   While	
   the	
  
Arab	
  Spring	
   moves	
   at	
   different	
  speeds	
   in	
  different	
  
countries,	
   Turkey	
   continues	
   to	
   urge	
   Arab	
  
governments	
  for	
  genuine	
  reform.	
  

A	
  new	
  and	
  democratic	
  era	
  will	
  give	
  the	
  Arab	
  world	
  
a	
   chance	
   to	
  be	
  the	
  masters	
  of	
  their	
  own	
  destiny.	
   It	
  
will	
   also	
   enable	
   the	
   people	
   to	
   develop	
   a	
   new	
  
paradigm	
   for	
   their	
   relationship	
   with	
   the	
   West	
  
based	
   on	
   equality	
   and	
   partnership	
   –	
   a	
   position	
  
Turkey	
  has	
  come	
  to	
   symbolize	
  under	
  its	
  reformed	
  
foreign	
   policy.	
   As	
   the	
   foreign	
   minister	
   of	
  Turkey,	
  
Ahmet	
   Davutoglu,	
   pointed	
   out,	
   “Turkey’s	
  
institutional	
   and	
   intellectual	
   help	
   in	
   enabling	
   the	
  
transition	
   to	
   democracy	
   in	
   Arab	
   world	
   are	
  
indispensable	
   parameters	
  for	
  democratic	
   future	
  of	
  
the	
   region.”9	
   Although	
   there	
   remains	
   numerous	
  
ambiguities	
  about	
  what	
   will	
  happen	
  in	
  the	
  region,	
  
what	
   has	
   emerged	
   in	
   the	
   Arab	
   world	
   is	
   a	
  
thoroughly	
  modern	
  mass	
  democratic	
  movement	
  in	
  
political	
  terms.	
  
Arab	
   revolutionaries	
   are	
   struggling	
   for	
  
“democratic	
   freedoms,	
   a	
   free	
   public	
   sphere,	
   and	
  
joining	
   the	
   contemporary	
   world	
   after	
   decades	
   of	
  
lies,	
   isolation	
  and	
  deception.”10	
   But	
   in	
  both	
  cases,	
  
transformative	
   hopes	
   remain	
   feeble:	
   the	
   political	
  
and	
   economic	
   order	
   in	
   these	
   countries	
   of	
  
resistance	
  is	
  fragile	
  and	
  susceptible	
  to	
  change.
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The	
   articles	
   that	
   are	
   collected	
   from	
   graduate	
   students	
   and	
   experts	
   on	
   the	
   topics	
   discussed	
   provide	
  
different	
  perspectives	
  to	
  evaluating	
   the	
  Arab	
  Spring.	
  We	
  hope	
  you	
  enjoy	
  reading	
  them.	
  And	
  as	
   always,	
  we	
  
are	
  looking	
  forward	
  to	
  hearing	
  your	
  feedback	
  on	
  the	
  discussion.
All THE BEST,
UMIT KURT AND OGUZ ALYANAK
BIBLIOGRAPHY:	
  
[1]	
  “Bouazizi:	
  The	
  Man	
  Who	
  Set	
  Himself	
  and	
  Tunisia	
  on	
  Fire”,	
  TIME	
  Magazine,	
  21	
  January	
  2011.
[2]	
  Brian	
  Whitaker,	
  “The	
  Arab	
  Spring	
  is	
  brighter	
  than	
  ever”,	
  The	
  Guardian,	
  14	
  March	
  2011.
[3]	
  Seyla	
   Benhabib,	
   “The	
  Arab	
   Spring:	
  Religion,	
   Revolution	
  and	
  the	
  Public	
   Square”,	
   Transformations	
  of	
   the	
  Public	
   Sphere,	
  10	
  
May	
  2011.
[4]	
  Nader	
  Hashemi,	
  “The	
   Arab	
   Revolution	
  of	
  2011:	
  ReKlections	
  on	
  Religion	
  and	
  Politics”,	
  Insight	
   Turkey,	
  Vol.	
   13,	
  No.	
  2,	
  2011,	
  pp.	
  
15-‐21.
[5]	
  Marina	
  Ottoway,	
  “The	
  Middle	
  East	
  is	
  in	
  Transition”,	
  Insight	
  Turkey,	
  Vol.	
  13,	
  No.	
  2,	
  2011,	
  pp.	
  1-‐8.
[6]	
   Lamis	
   Andoni,	
   “The	
   rebirth	
   of	
   Arab	
   activism”,	
   Aljazeera,	
   http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/
2010/12/20101231161958792947.html	
  and	
  also	
   see	
   Seyla	
  Benhabib,	
  “The	
  Arab	
   Spring:	
  Religion,	
  Revolution	
  and	
   the	
   Public	
  
Square”,	
  Transformations	
  of	
  the	
  Public	
  Sphere,	
  10	
  May	
  2011.
[7]	
  Tarıq	
  Ali,	
  “Who	
  will	
  reshape	
  the	
  Arab	
  world:	
  its	
  people,	
  or	
  the	
  US”,	
  The	
  Guardian,	
  29	
  April	
  2011.
[8]	
  “Tunisia	
  struggles	
  to	
  end	
  protests”,	
  Aljazeera,	
  http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/
2010/12/20101229122733122341.html
[9]	
  Raghida	
  Dergham,	
  “The	
  Arab	
  Spring	
  ReshufKles	
  Turkey’s	
  Cards”,	
  HufGington	
  Post,	
  15	
  May	
  2011.
[10]	
  Seyla	
  Benhabib,	
  “The	
  Arab	
  Spring:	
  Religion,	
  Revolution	
  and	
  the	
  Public	
  Square”,	
  Transformations	
  of	
  the	
  Public	
  Sphere,	
  10	
  
May	
  2011.

[3]

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
Umit Kurt studied in Political Science and Public
Administration at Middle East Technical University
in 2006. He received his MA degree from Sabancı
University in European Studies in 2008. He was a
research fellow at Keele University in UK, in 2006.
He was a research assistant in Sabancı University
between 2007 and 2008. He worked as a researcher in
TÜBİTAK project entitled “The role of Think-Tanks
In Formation of National Security Culture in Turkey”
and led by Prof. Bülent Aras. SETA Foundation has
published this project in November 2010. He was coauthor of that book with Bülent Aras and Şule Toktaş.
Dipnot Publishing House published his other book,
entitled “AKP Yeni Merkez Sağ mı?” in November
2009. He is currently a lecturer in Zirve University, at
Political Science and International Relations
Department in Gaziantep. Furthermore, his other
articles and journals were published in Turkish
Studies, Culture and Religion, European Journal of
Economic and Political Studies, Turkish Journal of
Politics and Turkish Policy Quarterly. He also wrote
many articles in Turkish for Toplumsal Tarih, Birikim,
Türkiye Günlüğü and Cogito. He joined numerous
international conferences and workshops in Stanford
University, European University Institute, Central
European University, ECPR, and East European
Conference. Currently, he is a PhD. candidate in
History Department of Clark University. He mainly
studies on Turkish-Armenian relationship after 2000s,
late century of the Ottoman Empire, the roots of
Turkish nationalism, critique of Turkish National
Historiography and civil-military relations and
Europeanization of civil-military relations in Turkey
particularly after 2000s. Umit Kurt is also in the
editorial board of European Journal of Economic and
Political Studies and Turkish Journal of Politics,
Sarajevo International and Comparative Law Review
Journal. umit105@gmail.com

Oguz Alyanak has been a student of social sciences
for the past nine years; obtaining his B.A degree at
Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts (double
major; Political Sciences/International Relations and
International Development/Social Change) and M.A
degree at Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey
(Political Sciences). His research at Bogazici
University concentrated on secular and Islamist
demonstrations in Turkey, which turned into an M.A
thesis entitled “The Constitutive Role of Loss in
Understanding Kemalism and Islamism in
Contemporary Turkey: A Comparative Look at
Republic Protests and Palestine Demonstrations”. He
is currently pursuing his second M.A degree in
University of Chicago with specialization in
Anthropology. His current research focuses on how
Turkishness is negotiated within the Turkish
community in Chicago. oguzalyanak@uchicago.edu

[4]

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
The Political Economy of Turkey’s
Response to the Arab Spring

leader Muammar Qaddafi. Ankara’s cautionary
approach to the events unfolding in Libya was
attributed to the existence of more than 25 thousand
Turkish citizens living in Libya, mostly workers and
engineers employed by Turkish construction
companies, as the government’s priority was said to
be ensuring the safety of its citizens.

Altay Atlı*
The uprisings in the Arab world proved to be a tough
trial for Turkey’s new foreign policy paradigm based
on the principle of “zero problems with neighbors”
and complicated its vision of becoming a key player,
if not outright leader, in the region. Before the
demonstrations rocked the Arab world, the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) government had been
winning “hearts and minds” throughout the Middle
East thanks to its firm stand on the Palestinian issue
as well as its efforts to solve problems in Lebanon,
Syria, and Iraq. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan was hailed as a hero who “taught a lesson to
Israel,” at the same time Turkey was lifting visa
requirements and expanding economic relations with
the countries in the region. The Arab world was
praising the “Turkish model” of democratic progress
in a predominantly Muslim society as a blueprint for
its own road to development.

Turkey strongly opposed a NATO intervention
against Libya on the grounds that it would be
“counter productive” and demanded that change be
brought to Libya not through external interference,
but from within.2 The interesting point is that for
Ankara, Qaddafi remained in the picture until keeping
him there was no longer possible. Erdoğan, who had
asked Mubarak to listen to the people and to go, said
in an interview about Qaddafi that he “expected the
Libyan leader to take positive steps” one of which
would be to appoint a new head of the state “of his
choice.”3 It was only more than two months after the
outbreak of unrest in Libya that Ankara decided to
dump Qaddafi. In early May, Erdoğan said that
instead of heeding his government’s calls, Qaddafi
preferred to shed blood and there was nothing more
to say in Libya: Qaddafi had to go.

The pro-democracy movement in Egypt provided an
opportunity for Turkey to promote its own “model”.
Erdoğan did not lose time in demanding the Egyptian
president Hosni Mubarak to “heed the desires of the
people” and to “step down”.1 The role that Turkey
had tailored for itself in the Middle East implied the
promotion of democratic change in the region and the
response to Tahrir Square was in perfect accordance
with this vision.

The contrast between Turkey’s responses to the
events in Egypt and Libya raises questions about
Turkey’s self-fashioned role as the promoter of
democratic change in the Middle East. With regard to
Egypt, Ankara had an uncompromisingly prodemocratic stance. In the Libyan case, the response
was rather delayed, which appeared as an effort to
gain time in order to find a compromise between the
establishment, i.e. Qaddafi and the democratic
forces.The most common explanation for this unclear
position referred to the economic involvement of
Turkey in the region. It was argued that, while
Turkey’s trade and investment relations with Egypt
were minimal, in Libya it had a significant economic
existence that needed to be protected. Therefore

The real challenge for Erdoğan and his government,
however, came with Libya. In stark contrast to its
response to the movement in Egypt — and despite the
fact that compared with Egypt the uprising in Libya
led to greater oppression and brutality — Turkey
hesitated to take a clear stance against the Libyan
[5]
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as the sector grew by 17.1 percent in one year.6 This
growth was mainly derived from activities overseas.
Over almost four decades up until the end of 2010,
Turkish contractors have undertaken more than six
thousand projects in 89 countries, with a total value
of 188 billion dollars. Libya is the second largest
market for Turkish contractors; they have been active
there since the early 1970s and the total value of the
529 projects they have completed so far is 26.4
billion dollars, of which nearly the half has been
realized over the last five years.7 The construction
industry has also spillover effects on trade, as the
bulk of Turkey’s exports to Libya consist of
construction materials. In comparison, Turkish
contractors have completed 25 projects in Egypt with
a total value of 593 million dollars, almost onefiftieth of what they have accomplished in Libya.8 In
other words, Turkey is doing big business in Libya.

Ankara could not part easily with Qaddafi, under
whose rule Turkish business in Libya had soared, as
easily as it did with Mubarak.
This argument implies that Turkey’s pursuit of
democratic norms and ideals in the region is little
more than rhetoric, which only lasts as long as
material benefits are preserved. While from a purely
realist and pragmatic perspective, this line could have
made sense, it nevertheless creates a false dichotomy
between the support for democracy and the
capitalistic pursuit of profits, which hinders a fuller
understanding of why Turkey’s responses to Egypt
and Libya differed so drastically. This essay proposes
a political economy approach that escapes the limits
of this simplistic dichotomy by focusing on the
interrelation between ideational and material factors
determining Turkey’s response in both cases.
In order to discuss the material side of the picture, we
need to locate both Libya and Egypt in the geoeconomic map of Turkey’s foreign economic
relations. According to the data released by Turkish
Statistics Institute, Turkey’s trade with Libya totaled
2.4 billion dollars in 2010, while its trade volume
with Egypt in the same period was 3.2 billion dollars.
4 On the other hand, according to Turkish Treasury
data, over the ten-year period between 2000 and the
end of 2009, Libya received a capital flow of 51.8
million dollars from Turkey, while the figure for the
Turkish capital received by Egypt over the same
period was 68.6 million dollars.5 Both trade and
investment figures point to a greater weight for
Egypt, however the real story lies somewhere else.

It is also important to note that before the uprising
broke out in Libya, Turkey had been on a major
diplomatic and economic offensive toward this
country. Erdoğan’s visit to Libya in November 2009
had been a turning point in relations, where the two
sides agreed, in Erdoğan’s words, “to forget the past
and build a new future”, lifted visa restrictions, and
signed an agreement for the reciprocal promotion and
protection of investments. During 2010, Erdoğan
went to Libya four more times, during one of which
he received the Qaddafi International Prize for
Human Rights; and his Trade Minister, Zafer
Çağlayan, paid five visits, all of which were
accompanied by sizeable groups of businessmen.
All was going well until the uprising muddied this
picture. Turkish construction companies in Libya—
around 200 of them—had to evacuate Libya, leaving
unfinished projects and equipment pools behind.
Minister Çağlayan announced that Turkish companies
had incurred a loss of 1.4 billion dollars in the form

Construction services are the backbone of the Turkish
economy, employing 1.4 million people and
accounting for 6 percent of Turkey’s GDP. In 2010,
when Turkey’s economy expanded by 8.9 percent,
construction was one of the main drivers of growth,
[6]

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
of uncollected revenues and that another 97 million
dollars of deposits remained in Libyan banks.9 To
these figures should be added the losses caused by
physical damage. On the other hand, the projects that
the Turkish companies were working when the
uprisings began had a total value of 15.3 billion
dollars, and the fate of these projects remain
uncertain.

regime, this was the case in Libya. However, if the
current regime is deposed, but only to be replaced by
another form of an authoritarian regime, there will be
no guarantee for Turkish companies to have the same
favorable business environment as they did under
Qaddafi. Another possible scenario for post-Qaddafi
Libya is democratic transformation. The important
question is whether democracy will take root from
within or will be imposed from without.

Losing Libya would certainly be a blow for the
Turkish economy, and from an economic point of
view one could argue that Turkey did not turn its back
to Qaddafi right away, as it did with Mubarak,
because without him the future of Turkish business in
Libya could be jeopardized. This line of argument,
however, implies that democracy in Libya or the
Middle East in general is not a concern for Turkey,
since it can be easily dismissed when capitalistic
benefits are at stake. My argument is that
counterposing support for democracy to the pursuit of
material benefits in this way is ungrounded because
the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In
fact, in a neo-liberal setting, the two are interrelated
in the sense that pursuing one’s material benefits can
require the involved party to adhere to universally
accepted norms such as democracy, whereas, in the
opposite direction, promoting democracy as a value
might require the actor in question to possess
economic power so that it can have leverage in
political and social issues.

Under the Qaddafi regime, that is since 1969 when he
overthrew the king and established the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Turkey never felt the need to pressure the
Libyan leader to heed the desires of Libyan people.
Democracy in Libya is now a concern for Turkey, not
only (but mainly) because democracy will be decisive
in determining the fate of Turkish business presence
in Libya. Turkey’s procrastinated response did not
exactly refer to a preference of capitalistic benefits
over democracy, rather what Turkey did was to wait
for different options for the post-Qaddafi period to
develop so that it could make its choice. The
alternatives included two democratic options:
democracy from within, i.e. through the prodemocracy opposition, or democracy from without,
i.e. through Western intervention. Turkey clearly
preferred the first option, since the second option was
highly likely to create a post-Qaddafi Libya in which
business opportunities, particularly in the
construction sector, would be distributed to
contractors from Western countries. Whereas the
experience of Iraq and Afghanistan set precedence for
this scenario, a recent statement by the head of the
Turkish Contractors Association, Erdal Eren, clearly
revealed the concerns. Eren explicitly stated that the
NATO intervention in Libya had economic motives
and the business environment that is likely to emerge
after the intervention was not going to be a favorable
one for Turkish companies.10 At the end of the day,
Turkey opposed the NATO intervention and decided

Business in a foreign country requires a favorable
environment to flourish. If the market in question is a
democracy, the rule of law provides this environment.
The dilemma here is that a non-democratic regime
can also provide a good business environment,
however in this case it would be based on relations of
patronage. In other words, only selected business
actors would be able to benefit from the environment
and others would be excluded. Under the Qaddafi
[7]
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instead to provide financial support for the opposition
groups in Libya. It was also while the NATO
intervention was on the way that the Turkish
Parliament hurriedly ratified the investment
agreement that was signed during Erdoğan’s visit to
Libya in November 2009. In other words, Turkey was
preparing for the post-Qaddafi period.

Turkey and prioritizing the preservation of status quo
in countries where Turkey is doing business. The two
are not mutually exclusive and this is a false
dichotomy. In fact, within the neo-liberal framework,
democracy can be (and usually is) supported for the
purpose of improving business prospects, while
increasing business volumes can provide an actor
with the leverage it needs for assuming a role as the
promoter of democratic values in its region. Turkey is
experiencing both, and the variation in its responses
to the uprisings in Egypt and Libya clearly illustrate
the dynamics of the crisis response process where
both support for democracy and existence of large
long-term business volumes are involved in an
intertwined manner.

Turkey supports democracy in Libya, and wants this
to be achieved through local dynamics and this
preference is directly linked to its calculations for the
future of Turkish business in the country. In Egypt,
with the absence of long-term business prospects,
Turkey’s promotion of democracy was only related to
the purpose of strengthening its role as a key player in
the region; therefore the response to the uprising was
fast and firm. In Libya, the construction business
complicated the picture, and Ankara needed time to
determine its response.
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The uprising in Syria constitutes an even greater
challenge for Turkey. Not only is there an intense and
complicated web of economic relations between
Turkey and Syria, but the two countries are also
neighbors, which causes additional problems such as
refugees and cross-border humanitarian crises. At the
time of writing this essay, thousands of Syrian
refugees were crossing the Turkish border in order to
escape persecution by the Assad government.
Turkey’s response so far has involved taking care of
the Syrians crossing the border and asking Assad to
make reforms. To what direction Turkey’s Syria
policy will eventually develop remains to be seen.
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In conclusion, Turkey’s response to the Arab spring is
marked by different approaches to similarly
motivated uprisings in different countries but this is
by no means a sign of inconsistency in Turkey’s
foreign policy. It is not about supporting democracy
in countries with fewer economic prospects for
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Footsteps of Revolution in the Land of
Queen Sheba

South. Since the summer of 2009, hundreds have
been killed and more than a quarter of a million
people displaced by clashes between government
troops and northern Houthi rebels belonging to the
minority Shia Zaidi sect. The government declared a
ceasefire with the northern rebels in February 2010.
Inspired by the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, in
January 2011 Yemen’s opposition began to unite, and
thousands of Yemenis have started protests against
the 33-year rule of president Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Even though Yemen has been the scene of social
unrest for several decades, Saleh had been able to
maintain the status quo thanks to tribal support and to
U.S. financing. Until 2011, anti-government
sentiments were concentrated in the southern region
of Yemen, which, since the unification in 1990, has
been struggling for independence, and in the northern
mountains of Sa’da, which seek the return of the rule
of Imams.

Bezen Balamir Coskun*
Yemen, as a Persian Gulf country, has been at the
crossroads of ancient spice roads connecting Africa,
the Middle East and Asia for thousands of years. The
Romans called this fertile and wealthy country
Arabia Felix, in contrast to the Arabian Deserts to the
North. However, compared to its wealthy and
glorious past, Yemen is today one of the poorest,
underdeveloped and conflict-ridden nations in the
world. In five years Yemen has witnessed six wars
and more than 40 percent of the population lives on
less than two dollars a day. Corruption and the
mismanagement of the country’s oil resources
brought Yemen to the brink of collapse.
In 1967 the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY) was formed in Southern Yemen, comprising
Aden and former Protectorate of South Arabia.
Between 1967 and 1971 thousands flew north
following a crackdown on dissidents and armed
groups formed to overthrow government. [(NOTE:
Insert the name before this abbreviation.)] (YAR) and
PDRY clashes started in 1972. The modern Republic
of Yemen was born in 1990 when traditionalist North
Yemen and Marxist South Yemen merged after years
of border wars, with Ali Abdallah Saleh as president.
The peace broke down in 1994 with a short civil war.
Armies of the former north and south, which had
failed to integrate, gathered on their former frontiers
as relations between southern and northern leaders
deteriorated. President Saleh declared a state of
emergency and dismissed the southern government
members following political deadlock and sporadic
fighting. The civil war ended in defeat for separatist
southerners and the survival of a “unified” Yemen.
Still, tensions persist between the North and the

Politically, Yemen is a one party state: the general
People’s Congress. Although the government has
allowed opposition, its influence in policy making is
limited. The only real contender to Saleh has been AlAhmar’s clan, where the Hashid family has
constituted the main opposition to the government for
many years. Apart from the Hashid, Bakhils are the
second most powerful tribe in Yemen. Through the
years Saleh ensured their support with financial
incentives and preferential treatments. The social and
economic gap between the upper class who have links
with the government and the impoverished majority
population that suffers from unemployment and
social inequalities has brewed the anger against the
regime.
Current protests have spread through invitations sent
to all parties including the Houthi’s in the north, the
tribes, trade unions, civil society organizations and
the army inviting them to join the protests. For the
first time in this history people from Southern Yemen
[9]
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stopped calling for separation, raised the national flag
and demanded an end to Saleh’s regime. Yemeni
people seem to be actually united in their aim to
change the regime through civil disobedience. If the
whole uprising is not revolutionary, it is revolutionary
to witness the sense of unity in a country with clearcut tribal and ideological differences. The key
moment to now was when Hussein al-Ahmar, the
chief of Yemen’s second largest but most powerful
tribal confederation, joined the protesters and
promised to offer protection. Even al-Houthi, who
fight for independence and generally have nothing to
do with protestors, offered their support and
resources. Despite the differences, the established
opposition encouraged the uprising and street revolt.

While the Yemen protests share similar motivations to
those in Egypt and Tunisia, it is still not clear that they
will become successful. Unfortunately, Saleh did not
follow Mobarak of Egypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia and
leave the throne peacefully, but has insisted on
dealing with protests by force. As of this writing, at
least 200 protestors have been killed and thousands
wounded in four months of protests. In June, 2011,
President Saleh was flown to Saudi Arabia, suffering
from injuries as a result of an explosion at his official
compound. Still, Saleh had not formally resigned his
office, but only temporarily handed power to his longterm vice president, Abd al-Rab Mansur al-Hadi.
Yemen’s socio-political terrain consists of tribes. The
country’s complex tribal dynamics are reflected in the

course of events following the absence of Saleh after
the explosion. The crisis had escalated into a fight for
power between Yemen’s most powerful families:
Saleh’s family and the al-Ahmar family. The personal
animosity between the sons of the late Sheikh
Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar and the sons and
nephews of Saleh have been an obstacle to peaceful
regime change in Yemen. Right now, the protests of
urban youth and civil society activists have been
sidelined in the power competition between armed
factions of these tribal elites. Earlier feelings of unity
within the society have begun to fade. There is a need
for a genuine mobilization of the public. The
escalation of conflict is dangerously paving way to the
fragmentation of the state in Yemen.
As the political battle in Yemen escalates, the most
immediate challenge is to avert a civil war. Even if
Yemenis avoid these outcomes and a peaceful
transition occurs, they will face an economic crisis,
regional tensions and an unstable security
environment. Among all, the country is in danger of
the infiltration of al-Qaeda terrorists into the country.
Given U.S. security forces have intensified their
attention to hunt Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni cleric
and a member of al-Qaeda, the failed state of Yemen
could become the next target for an U.S.-led
intervention. It is important for the international
community to understand the complexities of Yemeni
politics and society, and to act accordingly. It is also
important to integrate Yemen into the international
community not to isolate it. Lack of successful nationbuilding and state-formation, the tribal dynamics of
Yemeni politics and society, and the failed-state
phenomenon blur the possibility of peaceful transition
in Yemen. In short, Yemen needs strategies and
political will for a successful revolution.
*Assistant Prof, Dr., Zirve University, International Relations
Department. Gaziantep/ TURKEY. bezenbalamir@gmail.com
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Two Sides of the Same Coin;
Conflicting Views of Islamism in
Pakistan
Jeanette Bailey*
The turbulent nature of the political systems and
government structure in Pakistan has given rise to
many different religious Islamic groups. Two of the
most notorious groups are the Jama’at-e-Islami (JI)
and the Jama’at-ud-Da’wa (JD), as referenced by
Humeria Iqtidar in her book Secularizing Islamists?
(2011:ix). This essay will examine both differences
and similarities between the JI and the JD.
The JI Islamist group began in Pakistan in 1944,
during the British colonial rule. Founded by scholar
Mawdudi, the group was composed entirely of
religious clergy. Their goal was to maintain a pure
Islamic movement in a push toward making Pakistan
into a true Islamic state. Shortly after its founding a
shift in the movement entered the group into the
political arena, where they fought to bring about an
Islamic revolution by using the democratic process to
enforce a change in the state that would then trickle
down to the masses. This shift toward a government
focus led to dissension in the group. While still
democratically motivated today, the base of the
movement is now composed of middle-class business
men and women.
In contrast to the beginning of the JI, the JD was a
movement created in response to Russia’s war with
Afghanistan. JD’s original base pulled from the
socially “undesirables,” and their sole mission was
established to be jihad against the ‘godless secularist
communists’. The JD was backed, and trained, by
CIA, with money from the United States and Saudi
Arabia, who then used the JD to their strategic
advantage in the cold war with Russia. With the

completion of the Afghanistan-Russian war the JD
turned its attention to fellow Muslims whom they
believed to have been corrupted by Western
influence. They waged a new struggle to reform all
Muslims, establishing their view of traditional
Islamic practice as the only true Islamic practice.
Like the JI, the JD also sought to establish an Islamic
state.

While both Islamic groups today seek to establish the
traditional Islamic State, they are far from allies. It
would seem that similar goals are not enough to form
a homogenous unification. Many Islamic groups exist
as oil that has been agitated in water. They form little
droplets that race about trying to collect others like
them, while simultaneously being pulled apart by
similar droplets of oil attempting to achieve the same
unification. The JI and JD may both seek the same
end result, but much like the oil in water, they have
very different opinions about what a traditional State
looks like and how that State should be obtained.
The Jama’at-e-Islami believes that a democratic
political approach should be used to gain control of
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the State. That power should then be used to
implement change in favor of Islam at the
governmental level. The JI has struggled with this
mission since their inception and has yet to achieve
all that was hoped for in the beginning. Through this
process their goals and interpretations of the Qur’an
continually fluctuate to meet the needs of the times.

They are concerned with their namesake and dislike
the more militant fashion of the JD, whose faces are
synonymous with the global ideal of terrorism. The JI
worry that the actions of the JD, who have claimed to
be moving away from a militant focus, will cause the
world to associate Islam and violence. Such
associations would harm their political potential and
undermine their end goals.
The Jama’at-ud-Da’wa prefers to be seen as a social
pressure group that leans on the government to
implement Islamic ideals. They see democracy as
another form of secularization and see the JI’s
approach to seeking power in the government as a
long series of failures. They also believe that the
incorporation of Islam and democracy has led the JI
to be corrupt. In the minds of the JD the JI are not
true Islamists.

Tensions between the two groups also rise as they
attempt to pull constituents from the same pool. Both
groups spend time and money engaging in
humanitarian acts to gain public support for their
rhetoric. Supporters of each group look down at the
members of the other and there is a constant strain of
tug of war to build the largest
support base.
Whether political groups, or
social pressure groups, and
recognized or not, both the JI and
JD are influenced by
globalization and modernity. The
JI changed their goals early on to
focus on democratic politics; a
tool derived by the secular
capitalist world that they are in
jihad against. The JD, too, has
changed, looking to take a step
back from their militant history
in order to gain popularity and
favor in the eyes of the people. The
JD believes that power does not belong to the people
but to Allah alone; yet in seeking the favor of their
constituency they gain power in a democratic game.
As the unrest in the Middle East moves forward and
governments, political parties and social movements
begin to carve out a new identity, the Islamic world
will have to either find a blending of Islam that is
applicable to all, or learn to be content with mild
variations in religious interpretations and practice.
The Qur’an calls for unity and peace, but until the
agitation of the water is able to cease, the oil cannot
find common ground.
* She is currently studying in the liberal arts and sciences as a
p s y c h o l o g y m a j o r i n P o r t l a n d S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y.
jeanettebaileym@gmail.com
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Egypt and the "Arab spring": Notes on
facts and challenges
Moises Garduño García *
After Mubarak’s fall, the issue in which scholars,
moral leaders and many people are working
nowadays is in the best way to carry out Egypt’s
transition to democracy. Many young people who
participated in the creation of the unthinkably
successful (1) Egyptian revolution, had in the last days
of March, attended training workshops on popular
election mechanisms, transparency and other
activities related to the surrender accountability and
human rights monitoring. Popular organization in the
protests, which manifested itself in efforts to care for
the houses, streets and neighborhoods (2) as well as in
the sale and distribution of medicaments (usually a
business controlled by the Coptic population) to the
mosques and hospitals, today steps up to the
commitment to “safeguard the revolution” and to
participate directly in building the political destiny of
their country.
Institutions like University of Cairo, the Center for
Political and Strategic Studies Al Ahram and the
Center for Strategic and Future Studies of Medinat
Nasr, to cite some institutions in the Egyptian capital,
have promoted several efforts to build a clean
parliamentary and presidential election at year end (3).
The debate caused by monitoring the referendum on
March 19, where the Egyptian people could exercise
their opinion about accepting or not a series of
reforms to the constitution (including those to limit
mandates of the president and to reduce the
requirements to be a candidate), helped to generate a
new interest in Egyptian citizens to forget the
pessimism and distrust about voting that prevailed
under the old regime.

However, we still have “bumps in the road” in this
process. For example, the army’s role as guarantor of
security and justice has had a lot of critics among the
Egyptian population. One evidence of this is the
report “The army and the People Never Were
One” published by the activist Maikel Nabil
SanadMark, who states that the military had been
responsible for supplying ammunition to the police
trying to suppress the riots of revolution in the first
stage (from 25 January to 29 January, 2011), and who
had also participated in the arrest, imprisonment and
even torture of many demonstrators in several
attempts to invade the Tahrir Square during a second
stage (from 29 January to 11 February, 2011) and
whom they claim now works in the monopoly of the
media, the ban on taking pictures in the center of the
city and some incentives to obedience through mobile
telecommunications companies via text message at
the present stage (since the fall of Mubarak up to
now)Mark.
The report shall be added to numerous allegations of
other protesters against the Egyptian army and
unjustified detention, abuse of power, and even
torture. Thus, people have put into question the
activities of the Egyptian army in its “police
working” thereby increasing concern about the
administration of justice in the streets of the
capital. This is complemented by the announcement
of the army on March 22, 2011, when it banned any
demonstration or strike, subjecting people to
imprisonment or heavy fines. This, of course, would
cause popular discontent and more protests in first
days of April, 2011Mark.
In regard to the international environment, the
expansion of the “Arab Spring” to certain “strategic
countries” has caused the “Great Powers” to interfere
in these processes (whether political, intelligence or
military) to maintain their interests in the area,
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especially the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia and IranMark.
Analyzing the most important events in Egyptian
foreign policy since Mubarak’s departure — this
includes Mawafi’s visit to Syria, the authorization to
several Hamas leaders to attend a meeting in
Damascus via the Cairo airport, the permission for
the passage of an Iranian ship by way of Suez, the
neutrality in the Hariri’s case in Lebanon, along with
a “friendly approach” with Hezbollah and the
selection of Sudan as the first foreign destination of
Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to define the priority of
Egyptians on the subject of the Nile — we can
perceive the intent of a policy based on the main
interests of Egypt in what looks like the quest of a
regional consolidation in its area of influence, a
similar case to what Turkey does with its Iranfriendly relations and its cooperation with the U.S.
and Israel at the same timeMark.
Then, Egypt may be the target of pressure from a
Washington-TelAviv axis to moderate the conduct of
its foreign policy and turn in a direction similar
Mubarak’s. To keep an independent foreign policy
that achieves the export of the internal values that
domestic politics of Egypt intends to build is a future
challenge for the next Egyptian rulers. Although the
popular consensus remains the demands of social and
political rights of the people, domestic protests in
Egypt have sent clear messages concerning the
international affairs, or at least its regional policy,
announcing in demonstrations their commitment to
the Palestinian people to fight for the respect of
human rights in Gaza, Palestinian unity and the
rejection of the Israeli settlement program, and
supporting other causes, such as support for the Iraqi
people in their rejection of the U.S. armed presence,
the demands of the people in Bahrain and Syria and
slogans for the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh in
Yemen. This summary allows notice of a consensus
among the different Arab peoples, a dismissed
phenomenon since the pan-Arab philosophy of Gamal

Abdel Nasser and the widespread opinion for the
Palestinians in their conflict with IsraelMark.
In this sense, a revolution that emerged without
leaders now must build a strong government in order
to create a strong regional leadership to remain
independent of the threat of these factors. Many
young people, especially young people in Egypt, still
have hopes for this and are working day and night to
point out anomalies in the process of this
construction, issues that for some analysts becomes
like a renaissance, not only political but also social,
due to the plural participation of all social strata,
without religious or ethnic divisions and with
political hopes in commonMark.
Egypt enjoys a moment of “high responsibility”.
New political parties may be born based on young
people who until now did not participate in any
existing organization. But of course there are also
fears. Fears of radicalization and the chaos created in
part from fear that the new State cannot meet the
minimum aspirations of the people, as was the case in
other transition experiences in the world (and whether
by revolution, armed interference, elections or other
processes) that have failed to meet those challenges
and whose transition to democracy did not complete,
such was the case of Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Mexico
and other countries which, with different stories and
different ways, have experienced a “change in the
name of democracy” but where problems such as
corruption, violence, unemployment and political
unrest have prevailed in spite of that experience. Thus
the real challenge will be how Egypt responds to the
aspirations of its people, how it improves basic
services, how it accommodates a new Islamist
government apparatus (once again, can we see
Turkey?), how it rehabilitates the reputation of
itsnational army in order to improve its relationship
with the people after the elections. As we have seen,
the army must act as guarantor of the democratic
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process and not as a repressive apparatus, an issue
that is more reminiscent of devisive work of
intelligence members than the army itself, and thus
maintain what for many Arabs means the Egyptian
model of resistance, if not a paradigm according the
history of the Arab world, where it has been a
cultural, social and linguistic model and a source of
political inspiration to consider.
*	
   Moises Garduño is Professor at Faculty of Political and Social
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The Arab Spring and the Turkish Model
Alper Y. Dede*
The notion of regime change through mass uprisings
in the Middle East was inconceivable until the mass
uprisings started in Tunisia after a young Tunisian
street vendor set himself on fire to protest the local
authorities. Until this “Arab Spring” started, experts
of the region had been commenting on the need for
gradual reform to make the transition from the
inefficient and authoritarian status-quo regimes to
more democratic ones. Accordingly, the routes to
democratization in the region had to be through
gradual social, economic and political reforms. In this
vein, gradual change and transition to more
democratic regimes in the region would be inevitable
as secularization and modernization took root in the
long run. Additionally, people in the region would
become fed up with the authoritarian rulers and create
internal pressures for more democracy. A developing
civil society and international pressures from the
world community would aid the whole process of
democratization. In short, these were briefly the
recipes for a possible route to democratization in the
Middle East until the mass uprisings on the Arab
streets. However, the way that the Arab Spring took
place seems to be in contradiction with what the
experts had been arguing regarding the prospects of
democratization in the region.
Political Change through Revolutions?
On one hand, the idea of political change through
revolutions is not something new for the region. The
Iranian revolution of 1979 replaced the Shah regime
with an Islamic autocracy. On the other hand,
political change through revolutions is completely
unexpected in the region. Besides the structural
factors (such as the overall inefficiency of the
governments in the region, high rates of

unemployment and underemployment, mass poverty,
authoritarianism, and lack of democracy), two
additional factors fueled the uprisings on the Arab
streets:
i) the availability of modern means of
communication, and ii) the well-educated young
masses’ high levels of frustration as a result of
stagnancy and inefficiency of the regimes whose only
purpose was to maintain the status quo. Without these
two factors, the Arab Spring would not have been
possible.
Social sciences teach us that mass movements or
uprisings do not take place in a vacuum. Certain
structural factors must exist for the mass movements
to ferment, like high rates of unemployment, mass
p o v e r t y, e c o n o m i c c r i s e s , i n e ff i c i e n c y o f
governments, lack of democracy and
authoritarianism. Additionally, the movement
organizers must be able to effectively communicate
with each other and with the members, to mobilize
the available resources to attract new members to the
movement, to promote political activism, to take
available opportunities whenever and wherever they
can, and to frame their grievances to urge members to
take part in the collective action. In a way,
availability of the means of social media for the
frustrated young educated Arabs became an
opportunity for them to disseminate their
revolutionary messages through the Internet as well
as providing them an avenue to frame their messages.
In other words, the mass uprisings could become
possible as a result of the availability of
communication among the group members through
the Internet.
Can the Turkish Process of Democratization
Genuinely Become a Model for the Region?
The Turkish Republic was established in 1923 and
shifted from authoritarian single-party rule to a
democratic multiparty system in 1950. Since 1950 —
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despite several interruptions in the form of military
interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and the ememorandum in 2007 — Turkey has exhibited
significant strides toward democratization during the
tenures of Adnan Menderes and Turgut Özal as prime
ministers. A similar process is currently going on
under AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and
Development Party) rule. While many countries of
the Middle East have been experiencing mass
uprisings, the following question has to be answered:
Can Turkey’s unique democratization experience
since the AKP’s rise to power be a model for the
Middle Eastern countries as well as for the Ikhwan
and other political actors in the region? For some,
Turkey has now politically and economically become
a model country for the rest of the region. Thus, what
makes Turkey attractive for the emerging regimes?
Recently, one of the prominent Ikhwan figures, Abdel
Moneim Abou Al Fotouh, indicated that the Ikhwan
would form a new party like Turkey’s ruling AKP (1).
A similar statement was made earlier by Rachid
Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s Islamic Al Nahda
movement. To understand the appeal of the Turkish
model, we have to have a look at what the model is
and how it became appealing.
During the Cold War years, Turkey had limited
economic and diplomatic relations with the Muslim
world since the Kemalist elites during those years
naively assumed that increasing foreign relations with
other Muslim countries would be detrimental to the
secularist nature of the Turkish republic. This selfimposed isolationist policy remained in place until
the AKP’s rise to power in 2002. However, feint signs
of departure from this strict isolationist policy existed
during Turgut Özal’s leadership in the 1980s and
early 1990s, before the AKP’s rise to power. By
liberalizing the Turkish economy and enabling the
emergence of conservative businessmen coming
mostly from conservative towns in central Anatolia,

Özal actually allowed the conservative capitalists of
Turkey—dubbed the Anatolian tigers—to expand
economically. Those capitalists later formed the
social and economic backbone of the AKP rule in
Turkey. Currently, it is this new class of conservative
businessmen that take the AKP’s economic and
political openings to the Middle East. This unique
mutual relationship between the conservative
capitalists and the AKP was beneficial to both: The
AKP found much needed political and economic
support against the secularist establishment while the
conservative capitalists found venues to expand their
political and economic operations under the AKP’s
protection in the new era. This unique relationship
forms the first pillar of the Turkish model.
The Turkish Islamists’ market-oriented economic
approach constitutes the second pillar of the Turkish
model. The Turkish economic model is especially
marked by the Turkish economy’s success with
rapidly increasing GNP per capita and steady
economic growth over the years, independent of
state-led economic growth. The Turkish economy is
also well connected to the global economy and is able
to integrate the conservative entrepreneurs who
mostly come from central Anatolian cities like
Kayseri, Konya and Gaziantep. Turkish economic
successes also include increasing exports, and the
growing share of industrial goods in Turkish exports,
which are mostly lacking elsewhere in the Arab
world.
In this approach, economic successes and gains, not
pure ideology, are the main driving forces. Earlier, in
the late 1980s, the liberal spaces created by Turgut
Özal’s reforms paved the way for the emergence of
this type of market-based Turkish Islamism from
which the rest of the Arab world was deprived. As a
result of their export-oriented economic growth
strategies, the Turkish Islamists have gradually
become market-seekers: as they economically grew,
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they started to seek new markets for their goods. The
new markets were found in the Middle East, Africa
and Central Asia, whose people were predominantly
Muslims. This expansion overlaps with the AKP’s
long-term economic strategies to expand Turkey’s
exports that would inevitably make Turkey a country
that has a larger role in the regional trade. This could
also make Turkey a soft power in the region as well.
In the last decade, Turkish goods have become very
popular in the Middle East. Turkey’s popularity in the
region is not just limited to goods. Indeed, Turkish
television soap operas have become very popular in
the region. Additionally, as a result of lifting of visa
restrictions with many of the countries of the region,
the volume of Middle Eastern tourists visiting Turkey
has sharply increased. A similar increase has taken
place in the Middle Eastern investments in Turkey
since the AKP’s rise to power. Thus, Turkey’s
economic success and the newly emerging
conservative business elite have increased its soft
power in the region and that constitutes the third
pillar of the Turkish model.
Conclusion
In addition to the three pillars mentioned above,
Turkey’s process of democratization, rising economic
performance, Erdoğan’s and the AKP’s popularity in
the Arab world (particularly regarding the Palestinian
issue and Turkey’s gradual distancing from Israel),
and the AKP’s cultural-religious affinity with the
people of the region in contrast to the Kemalists and
secularists in Turkey has also contributed to its
attraction to people in the Middle East. Additionally,
the AKP’s ability to successfully move from
relatively heavy Islamist tones into a centrist political
movement with a conservative outlook has
significantly contributed to Turkey’s gradual rise as a
soft power in the region. Indeed, on several different
occasions, AKP officials have described themselves
as a political party that is similar to the European
Christian Democrats, which indicates the AKP’s

willingness not be perceived as a hardliner Islamist
party (2). Before coming to power, the AKP elites
gained very valuable lessons from their experience
serving at the local levels. For instance, Erdoğan used
to be Istanbul’s mayor. Indeed, the AKP descends
from the political legacy of Erbakan’s National Order
Party, which has allowed the AKP members to build a
significant amount of parliamentary and
governmental experience over the years. Besides
gaining political experience, this served as a
moderating influence on the party itself. During the
AKP’s tenure, the motive to succeed economically
has often times superseded harsh ideological
positions and moderated ideological excesses in the
long run, besides exposing people to different ideas
and lifestyles as a result of increasing economic
transactions with the global economy.
These moderating factors or dynamics that are
peculiar to the Turkish model do not exist in the Arab
world, which clearly shows the distinctiveness of the
Turkish model. Considering the “democratic deficit”
argument regarding the Middle East in Western
academic and media circles, the Turkish model
becomes more meaningful because it suggests that
democracy can function in a Muslim country, and that
conservative Muslims can be democrats actively
advocating democracy, economic growth, and rights
and freedoms.
*Assistant Prof, Dr., Zirve University, Gaziantep/
TURKEY International Relations Department.
GAZIANTEP/TURKEY.alperyilmazdede@gmail.com
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Will geopolitics split along sectarian
lines in the Middle East? Witnessing
the rise of a sectarian speech amidst
war of perceptions
Camille Germanos∗
The upheaval in Bahrain revived geopolitical rivalries
between Iran and the Arab Gulf States. These
rivalries are potentially to be drawn over sectarian
lines and could entrench the rift between the Sunni
and Shi’ite Muslim sectsMark. To prevent the
possibility of this ethnic conflict, we need to better
understand the intricacies of these competing
sectarian speeches. We propose to describe briefly in
this piece the formation of a sectarian speech in the
Middle East amidst a war of perceptions between the
leading Shi’ite and Sunni clerics.
When the battles of hearts and minds were first
started in the Middle East last January, two leading
clerics joined their voices with the Arab
revolutionaries, the Sunnite Ulema Sheikh Yūsuf alQaraḍāwiy and the Shi’ite Sayed Hassan Nasrallah.
Both of these were vocal about the Tunisian
revolution, which became the vanguard of the Arab
wave of upheavals. Both of them backed-up the
demonstrations that followed against totalitarian Arab
regimes in Egypt, Yemen and Libya. Yet, those
upheavals were never defined as sectarian or as
profoundly marked by geopolitics. The trend was to
describe these indigenous popular movements as
having no ambition to export themselves beyond the
national borders.
This political perception changed, sadly, when the
uprising expanded toward the frontiers of the Arab
world, namely Bahrain and Syria. The clerics’
diverging speeches delegitimized seriatim the
Bahraini and the Syrian oppositions as sectarian and

exogenous, with foreign conspirator agendas. The
adoption of diplomatic double majors by the
“International Community” did not ease the dogmatic
contradictions. We wonder if the Arab revolutions
will henceforth be able to transcend the Shi’ia—
Sunni divide.
Two opposing clerical voices: Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwiy
and Sayed Hassan Nasrallah
This sectarian dispute was indeed started March 2011
over the appraisal in Bahrain. It was during the
khutbat al-jum'a of 18 of March 2011, Ulema Sheikh
Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwiy, who is the president of the
World Federation of Muslim Scholars, described from
Doha, Qatar, that the Bahraini revolution was a
sectarian one. Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, theologian
and Secretary General of Hizballah, hinting to alQaraḍāwiy, responded in a speech he gave the very
next day in Lebanon. While al-Qaraḍāwiy excluded
the Bahrain revolution from the legitimate Arab
appraisal, Nasrallah claimed that the rights of dignity
and justice are not tributary of a sectarian identity.
These speeches, pronounced by two opposing
politically influential clerics, defined the future
perception of the Bahraini crisis. On one hand, Ulema
Sheikh Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwiy,Mark who in the past had a
prominent role within the intellectual leadership of
the Muslim Brotherhood, has been directly involved
through his khutba in both the Egyptian and
contemporary Arab revolutions. Al-Qaraḍāwiy, who
once called on Maydan al-Tahrir in Egypt for both
Muslims and Christians to join their prayers thanking
God, whom he said answered their prayers for
protection during the Egyptian revolution that had put
an end, on the 20th of February, to the corrupt regime
of Hosni Mubarak, later condemned on March 18 the
Bahraini opposition with his disgrace. On the other
hand, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, who, since 1993, has
been the Secretary General of Hezbollah, an armed
and religious organization considered to be the
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resistance by the official and popular Lebanese
discourse, Mark called on his allies from all
nationalities and sects for unity and coordination in
their fight against oppression and unfairness
particularly in Bahrain.
Various dimensions of the divergences between
Sheikh Yūsuf and al-Qaraḍāwiy Sayed Hassan
Nasrallah
The clerics’ perceptions echo the divergences
between the doctrinal and political differences
between the Sunni militant formations, e.g., the
Muslim Brotherhood, and Hezbollah, the Shi’ite
organization, in their fights for Justice and
FreedomMark. This historical disparity is to be
distinguished from the irreconcilable cohabitation of
Sunni and Shi’ite heritage of the war in Iraq; a
cohabitation that seemed recently to be repairing over
political, ideological, and dogmatic fields. One could
have hoped that the changes in the Arab and Islamic
world would permit a new departure toward an open
Islam, which would have put an end to the extremist
Salafist groups that have deepened the rupture
between the Sunni and the Shi’a since the 1980s.
The tensions in politics persist, despite all signs of
rapprochement between the Sunni and Shi’a in the
field of dogma and in the struggles between the
different armed Islamic factions in the Middle East.
The question is, are we witnessing the first signs of
the re-making of a sectarian speech? In the fields of
the social sciences, we accept that social categories
can also be conveyed through religious or political
speeches and that social groups can be constructed or
identified based on exogenous perceptions of their
constituencies. These social categories can be
appropriated and integrated by the group being
described who might start agglomerating and
describing themselves as such.
The same phenomena can also be described in

various ways: a social or a political reality can be
constructed with reference to a selected chapter(s) in
history.
If one were to draw a conclusion from the 20th
century and the example of the Bahraini outburst, the
opposition’s demand appears to be a social query for
justice, integration into civil services and equitable
wealth distribution. The Bahraini opposition,
perceived mainly as a Shi’ite movement, can equally
be accused of Persian affinities. Looking back to the
16th century, the island of Bahrain was indeed subject
to struggles for hegemony between the Arab and the
Persian shores of the Persian Gulf. “Truth” is
ambiguous in this case. It consists mainly of a
recollection based on the imagination and
mechanisms of perception and appropriation.Mark It is
exactly within this frame of thought that the speeches
of al-Qaraḍāwiy and Nasrallah are to be analyzed in
this piece.
Having been vocal on the Egyptian and the Tunisian
appraisals, after he prayed for the death of Qadhafi
and hoped for the Yemeni opposition to succeed in
days, al-Qaraḍāwiy declared that the Bahraini
revolution was a Shi’ite appraisal against the Sunni
and therefore was incomparable with the Tunisian,
Libyan, Egyptian or Yemani revolutions. AlQaraḍāwiy made reference to the early March events
when demonstrations had crossed sectarian lines. The
Ulema described the Shi’ite in Bahrain as attacking
the Sunni, squatting their mosques and vandalizing
their districts. Devoid of their legitimacy, the
Bahraini opponents to the regime were actually
described as vandal secessionists, and therefore the
Shi’ite clerics were called to seek dialogue with the
ruler who, according to al-Qaraḍāwiy, was willing to
negotiate and make concessions.
In fact, the social claims and quest for a constitutional
monarchy degenerated into violence and sectarian
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tensions when the Al-Khalifah monarch called for the
intervention of the Gulf military force. From a social
scientific perspective, such a move can only push the
opposition to define its identity in opposition to the
ruler by using exogenous associations. As it is
considered, rather than holding them in a national
Bahraini identity, the King has excluded the
opposition from both national and territorial
legitimacy.

No matter how one explains these mechanisms, the
fact is that the Bahraini demonstrators held posters of
Iranian and Hezbollah religious leaders to face the
public forces’ retaliation. This cost the Bahraini
insurrectionists being described by al-Qaraḍāwiy as a
group of Shi’ite dissidents. They were also accused of
foreign allegiance, as al-Qaraḍāwiy claimed that the
Bahraini Shi’ite were relating themselves to the
Iranians instead of identifying themselves as people
from the Arab Gulf.
Last, but not least, the eminent cleric al-Qaraḍāwiy
clearly contributed, in his long speech, to making a
difference between the Sunni and the Shi’ite sects and
that is exactly constitutive of a sectarian speech: “I
have always been accused of being against the
Shi’ite, I am not against the Shi’ite. I am only against
sectarianism and religious hatred.” A day later,
Saturday, 19 of March, 2011, Nasrallah took the
opportunity in his speech, delivered under the slogan
of solidarity with the Arab revolutions, to answer

back al-Qaraḍāwiy without naming him.
Looking at the structure of this speech, one can see
that Nasrallah first addressed the Bahraini, bringing
moral support to their opposition, by consolidating
religious support with their cause and re-describing
their appraisal as a peaceful movement. He then
addressed all religious clerics from the Sunni and
Shi’ite sects, as well as their political allies, namely
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Prime Minister of Turkey and
the Iranian Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hoseyni Khāmene'I,
to stand by the so-called human dignity and rights for
justice, irrespective of religious sectarianism and
urging them to remain attached to their common
values and to stand by the deprived and fight for the
most elementary human rights.
Thus, Nasrallah first called for the Bahraini to stand
by their principles and not to fear sectarian speeches.
He reassured the mostly Shi’ite opposition that there
were leading Sunni clerics who stood by their
legitimate demands. These words resonated even
more as they were reinforced by a large Sunni clerical
representation among the audience that day. He then
described the Bahraini revolution as peaceful
population appraisal that was faced with
governmental violence and murder. The Bahraini
went for dialogue, he claimed, and they stood by their
unity and their human values and reclamations.
Arabic armies were sent to stand by a regime that was
never menaced to fall. They locked the hospitals and
destroyed the peoples’ home. Even Loulou Square
was destroyed, a sign of the unbearable weight of the
opposition symbols. For those who are familiar with
the history and politics of the Gulf, it is
understandable that exogenous symbols, namely
Persian, are unbearable to these regimes, whose
national identities were also consolidated based on
external factors of especially Persian differentiation.
It is also unfortunate, but quiet frequent, to witness
amidst foreign military intervention the destruction of
national symbols.
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Having tightened the vise around al-Khalifa rule by
contrasting them to a peaceful opposition, Nasrallah
finally asked why one should keep silent on the
Bahraini movement, or worse, why one should attack
their claim just because of their sectarian religious
identity of being Shi’ite. The opposition in Bahrain
being mostly Shi’ite should not be deprived from the
right to stand up for their dignity, he claimed. No one
ever questioned the religions or sects of the
Palestinians, the Libyans, the Tunisians, or the
Egyptians to stand by their rights. How then could
some khutba attack these movements because of their
sectarian identity? The Bahraini movement is not
sectarian, Nasrallah ascertained, but rather a civil
peaceful movement as rightful as the Libyan or the
Yemeni rebels’ claims.
Nasrallah’s art of rhetoric and fighting history made
him sound more political than al-Qaraḍāwiy. But he
personally attacked the al-Khalifah rulers, threatening
at the same time the Arab monarchs of the Gulf. Such
a statement could in the least cost him a war of words
with his newly declared enemies, who “reminded”
him soon after that he was the leading figure of a
terrorist organization. The Bahraini’s response to
Nasrallah’s direct attacks was to menace all Lebanese
interests in the Gulf.
It is known in political science that if one can capture
the starting point of the break between main political
actors it becomes possible to justify a period in
history. Such a period might be triggered by the two
speeches that were delivered by Nasrallah and alQaraḍāwiy. There is no doubt that the dissonances in
perceiving the Bahraini crisis paved the way for
future struggles in the Middle East, especially if a
cynical betrayal of the aspirations of the Arab youth
will play in favor of the most rigid or quarrelsome
factions.
* Camille Germanos holds an MPhil from EHESS in Paris. She
[22]

is currently Research Associate to the National University of
Singapore’s Middle East Institute. The views expressed herein
are her own. Camille.germanos@yahoo.fr

***********************************************

A New Book:
Secular State and Religious Society:
Two Forces in Play in Turkey
Edited by Berna Turam
Palgrave Macmillan

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
Turkey as a Model Democracy?
Revisiting the Turkish Referendum
Oguz Alyanak* and Umit Kurt**
On the day before commemorating the martyrdom of
Saint Valentine, Guardian columnist Robert Talt
published an article that sketched the main points of
contention in Turkish democracy. Far from being a
model for the Middle Eastern states, let alone Egypt,
Talt paid a visit to the dark side of the moon, laid out
Turkey’s new path as one of Egyptification and,
following up on Gareth Jenkins’ statement that
Turkey exchanges militant authoritarianism with a
civilian one, warned his readers of the possibility of
an authoritarian comeback. At a time when the
international press was flooded with articles praising
the “Turkish model”, Talt has rowed the boat against
the flow, which was followed by the newly-appointed
American Consul-General Ricciardone’s critical
statement: “I do not understand how Turkish
journalists could be detained while at the same time
addresses about freedom of speech are given.”

In this article, we delve into Turkish political culture
and outline some of the “darker” aspects of the
“Turkish model”. Following the debate that Talt,
among many others, has started, we argue that Turkey

has yet to become a consolidated democracy that can
serve as an exemplar for the Middle East. To back
this argument, we point out to some of the lessons
that can be drawn from Turkey’s latest attempt at
democratization, the referendum of 12 September
2010.
Referendum Revisited
On 12 September 2010, precisely thirty years after
experiencing one of the four coup d’états, which have
indubitably shaped the course of Turkish democracy,
Turkish constituents attended a referendum to vote on
an amendment that would change 26 articles of the
current Constitution, established by the army
generals, notably, Kenan Evren, some twenty-eight
years ago. Ironic is that the constitution of 1982,
amended in various occasions, including the
referendum of 12 September 2010, was also the
product of another referendum conducted on 7
November 1982. The results in 1982 were an
overwhelming 91 percent to 9.
Perhaps, it was foolish optimism to expect results that
would radically deviate from the above given the
figures in 1982, when the shadow of Mr. Evren and
his brothers-in-arms were still present. However, in
2010, the picture was much different, and arguably
brighter. Both the supporters of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and the opposition
perceived the then-upcoming referendum as fair
game. In other words, there was hope that something
would change: be it the constitution, the “hapless
fate” of the Turkish Republic or the AKP itself.
Leaving the 2007 memorandum aside, Turkish
politics, for one thing, had not been intervened by the
military since 1997. Hence, the very visible hand of
the army in this equation was almost nullified.
Moreover, from a more academic perspective, it
could very well be argued that Turkey was adamant
on its process of democratization, although what the

[23]

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
word democratization means can itself be questioned.
Negotiations with the EU, though slow, were on
track, and so was the adoption of the chapters of the
acquis communautaire. Borrowing the vocabulary of
the political scientist Stephen Linz, there were
adequate variables to argue for, and more importantly
believe in, Turkey’s progression toward a
consolidated democracy.
Hope for Change?
Hope, however, was ephemeral. The night of 12
September 2010 proved to be one of those black and
white moments where, on the one side, those who
voted for the constitutional change were cheering in
euphoria, and the rest were saddened in remorse.
Whereas the results of the referendum were
predictable for some, they were frustrating and
surprising for others. What stood as surprising for us
is not necessarily the results, but rather the kinds of
discussions these results ignited among intellectual
circles and, more significantly, the repercussions of
such discussions for evaluating ideological cleavages
in Turkey. On the one hand, prominent academics and
columnists argued that the results reflected the
division of the Turkish society on the basis of secular
(read, Kemalist), conservative (read Islamist) and
ethnic (read Kurdish) identities. On the other hand,
certain academics, along with members of the AKP,
interpreted the results (and the overwhelming
percentage of votes in favor of a constitutional
change) as a potential for social incorporation and
adhesion. Rejecting the tri-partite categorical division
proposed by the former camp, the latter camp was
driven by the hope for finally changing Turkey’s
three-decade-old Constitution.
But change itself needs to be problematized not only
for what it brings, but how it is handled. If Turkey,
under the reign of the AKP government, is
undergoing a transformative stage in its modern

history, a stage that nourishes hope for change, be it
for the good or the bad, how can factors contributing
to this change be explained? What does such change
signify for Turkey? And where can the leitmotif that
is contributing to the ruling AKP’s voracious appetite
for change be found?

If one aims to portray the fundamental reason behind
the rise and success of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his
AKP, and decipher the rationale behind his (and his
party’s) success in the referendum, one should be
more aware of the historical context through which
such change has been taking place, and thus pay
closer attention to the structural-functionalist residues
of a social corporatist system bolstered by the lack of
a class-free system, let alone free of any deliberation
on class based struggle, and the prevalence of
conservatism and traditionalism as elements
substituting the moral void of laicite. These two
elements, coupled with transitions in the international
context (e.g., neoliberal revival and the impact of
globalization) contribute immensely to what can now
be called both a transformation of the Turkish
political culture. A clever constellation of these two
elements paved the way for Erdoğan to decode the
behavior of the Turkish constituents and orient the
AKP’s rhetoric accordingly.
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Change Without Class-Struggle?
As far as the Turkish context is concerned, since, it is
highly improbable to speak of a continuation of a
political culture constructed on class-based identities
or a public space that promotes discussion on class
relations, the use of the term “class formation” in
Turkey is indeed more of an oxymoron than a reality.
With the obvious exception being the 1970s where
the Marxist winds of the Cold War carried ideological
dusts leading to the formation of different factions
among the left and the right, and eventually to the
coup d’état of 1980 which put an end to not only the
nascent signals of a potential class-based system, but
also political activism in whole and monopolized
power in the hands of army general for a period of
two years, Turkey’s experience with class has either
been curbed under the rubric of an Islamic or national
unity. Whereas the former divided the society more or
less on the basis of religious preferences, the latter
imagined a conflict-ridden and classless society
where each and every citizen acted in harmony to
make the social organism, that is, the society, live and
prosper. Not only was this Durkheimian narrative on
social beings — which was transmuted into the
Turkish case by the pre-eminent ideologue of his
time, and the founding father of Turkish nationalism,
Ziya Gokalp — adopted as a de facto founding
principle of the Turkish Republic, but, throughout the
entire span of modern Turkish history, it continued to
be a principle organizing (and disciplining) Turkish
society. Thus, in a society where contradictory voices
were often repressed, either through the
administrative power of the government, juridical
power of courts or the hard power of the army, the
ruling governments enjoyed a great space of
maneuver, with being checked and balanced only by
the Constitutional Court or the army.
This also explains a great part of the tension attached
to the referendum. In conjunction with a “Yes” voting
in the constitutional referendum, the AKP’s plans to

enlarge membership of two top judicial bodies — the
Constitutional Court and the Higher Council that
appoints judges and prosecutors — have aroused
particular concern because the judiciary is still seen
by secular Turks as an ardent bulwark against
creeping “Islamization,” especially at a time when the
military is gradually retreating from politics.
The role of the three institutions — the military,
judiciary and state bureaucracy (including civilmilitary bureaucrats) — is worth a closer look for a
very simple reason: their intervention and impact on
Turkey’s democratic experience, in the name of
secularism, social order or the Kemalist legacy, has
simply failed to circumvent a political party with
Islamist roots claiming 47 percent of the votes in
national elections and 39 percent of the votes in local
elections, in 2007 and 2009, respectively. This
tripartite structure, guarding the legacy of Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish Republic,
played an active role in suppressing previous
governments with Islamist tendencies (such as the
Welfare Party’s closure in 1997) and was almost
successful in taking the AKP down in 2008. The
referendum of 2010 came at a time when this
structure was shattering, hence raising pro-secularist
fears and concerns about the implementation of the
AKP’s “hidden agenda” which would arguably lead
to “bad change,” that is change of the regime from an
arguably democratic one to an Islamist one.
Consequently, one of the biggest concerns rising from
the opponents of constitutional changes was that a
“Yes” vote would bring the removal or weakening of
an essential mechanism that supervised the actions of
the government.
Furthermore, it was argued that the victory of the
AKP in the constitutional referendum would
undermine the power of the military and make the
Turkish political system accountable to its voters and
elected officials rather than its soldiers. All these
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steps toward democratization transpire as a fullyfledged democratic transition, which enhances the
role given to the Turkish “political society.” This
“political society” encapsulates, as another prominent
political scientist Alfred Stepan underlines, core
institutions of a democratic political society such as
political parties, elections, electoral rules, political
leadership, intraparty alliances, and legislature. In a
nutshell, what the ramifications of this referendum
manifest are the consolidation of the aforementioned
institutions of a political society rather than appointed
elites of the étate. It is the instruments of the political
society that are taking over the role corruptly
practiced by the tripartite structure. Crystallization of
“political society” transformed these institutions and
agencies into subjects of political contestation and
paved the way toward a democratic system as “ the
only game in [the Turkish] town”.

Possibility of Conservative Change
At this point, we wish to start analyzing the second
dynamic in effect: conservatism. The current situation
regarding conservatism in Turkey could best be
described as an “opening of tradition” when
indicators such as the following are taken into
consideration: staunch support of conservative social
classes to Turkey’s EU-bid, the new civil constitution

initiative, democratic control of the armed forces, and
civilization of the political arena. These examples
would suffice to argue that in Turkey, the modernity
paradigm is shifting, and the terms “secular,”
“conservative,” “progressive,” “backward.”
“Kemalist” and “Islamist” are attaining new values.
What secular-Kemalists, who regard themselves as
modernist and progressive, do not comprehend,
however, is the fact that a conservative individual can
act in a progressive manner and an allegedly
progressive individual can, in turn, act in a
conservative manner. Hence, it would not be wrong to
speak of Islamist progressivism or Kemalist
conservatism. Both are hierarchical structurally and
both employ tools repressing internal, dissident
voices.
Moreover, this opening of tradition also brings
increased visibility in economic and social spheres of
public life. Conservative classes that have played a
considerable role in the AKP’s rise to power are the
“new-rising middle classes” of Turkey, which, in a
report published in 2007 by an international
organization, European Stability Initiative, was
termed also as the rise of the “Anatolian Tigers.”
These socio-economic classes literally encompass the
new industrial, commercial, and financial bourgeoisie
in Turkey. They willingly espouse democracy by
promoting active participation in civil society and
defend the neo-liberal mechanism of a free market
economy. Moreover, they also embrace Islamic
conservative values as their lifestyle and bring further
visibility of Islam to Turkish secular spaces. In doing
so, they do not necessarily relinquish their ties with
modernity/modernization. However, they represent an
alternative to modernity that can at its best be
considered a neo-conservative perspective vis-à-vis
mainstream secular modernity in Turkey. At this
point, the AKP incarnates the modernity standpoint of
these new conservative social classes.
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The two dynamics this article focused on are perhaps
the two most underestimated ones in discussions on
Turkish politics. The issue here is not that the
dynamics analyzed in this paper often go
undiscussed. In fact, there is plethora of discussion
especially on conservatism and traditionalism in
Turkey. However, for the most part, the discussion on
these two elements is often conducted on a
superfluous level, where symptoms of social and
political transformation are only linked with the
conduct of one political actor, and restricted to a
limited time frame. Nevertheless, the upshot of the
referendum cannot only be encapsulated in the almost
eight year reign of the AKP. In order to get a better
reading on the referendum, one must discuss it in
relation to the two dynamics that color the patterns of
Turkish political culture: the formation and
sustenance of a class-free society and the prevalence
of conservatism among all factions, including the
secular-Kemalist. From this perspective, AKP’s
continuous victory in consecutive elections since
2002 can be explained in terms of Erdogan’s
exceptional reading of these dynamics, and his
brilliant utilization of these dynamics in policy
debates. This, from a rhetorical perspective, is what
we can conclude as “perennial populism”: the
defining and distinguishing characteristic of the AKP
and its leader.

academics and journalists utter as a democratic
opening is in fact a pragmatic, and perennial, populist
policy scheme. With this in mind, Talt’s claim for
Turkey’s resemblances to Egypt find a stronger
ground.

* Oguz Alyanak – The University of Chicago, Social Sciences
** Umit Kurt – Zirve University, International Relations,
Gaziantep, Turkey

A Populist Democracy?
The AKP benefits from Erdogan’s perennial populism
in terms of bolstered competence and enhanced will
for policy-making. Presumably, this competence and
will for policy making enables the AKP to come up
with convincing answers (so convincing to the eyes
of the voters that they lead to landslide victories in
each election) to challenging questions (e.g., Turkey’s
membership in the EU, the Kurdish problem,
secularization, the status of the Alewite community,
etc.), thus leading to an expansion of the AKP’s
political domain. What lies beneath what many
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Academic tourists sight-seeing the
Arab Spring*
Mona Abaza**

manner. This is to be certainly welcomed because it
has marked a new phase that will possibly end the
dreadful misdoings of the 9/11 effect. It is certainly a
promising new phase that will hopefully be unmaking
the evil damage of Bin Laden.

I would like to share with this short piece a concern
that several of us in academia in Cairo have been
facing with the impact of the Arab Spring, to point to
some frustrations regarding the continuing unequal
academic relationship between so-called “local” and
Western experts of the Middle East, between broadly
speaking the North and the South (although this
classification is clearly clichéd), and the reshuffling
of the international division of labour in the academic
field whereby inequality is and will still be
prevailing.
Without sounding xenophobic, which is a growing
concern that personally worries me more than ever,
there is much to say about the ongoing international
academic division of labour whereby the divide
between the so called “theoreticians” of the North and
the “informants” who are also “objects of study” in
the South continues to grow.
I am indeed speaking of frustrations because “we” as
“locals” have been experiencing a situation, time and
again, of being reduced to becoming at best “service
providers” for visiting scholars, a term I borrowed
from my colleague, political scientist Emad Shahin,
at worst like the French would put it, as the “indigène
de service”, for ironically the right cause of the
revolution. To rather cater for the service of our
Western expert colleagues who typically make out of
no more than a week's stay in Cairo, a few shots and a
tour around Tahrir, the ticket to tag themselves with
the legitimacy and expertise of first hand knowledge.
It is no secret that the Arab revolutions have revived
academic interest in the region in a clearly positive

But for the local community of academics, in
particular what concerns my colleagues at the
American University in Cairo, many of us have come
up recently with similar observations. Namely the
bewilderment at the lavish grants and scholarships
that many of our Western colleagues have recently
benefited from to research our beloved revolution.
Many of us have been bombarded by emails from
Western colleagues for such service providing.
Now, I do not mean to express any sort of unjustified
resentment towards our Western colleagues, who
enjoy definitively far better conditions regarding
teaching load, travel allowances and research grants.
Never mind still, if in the academic international
division of labour, we as “locals” are still struggling
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to scale up to buy time to undertake research and to
write. Nevertheless, I think that there is a price to be
paid for being on the spot of events and for not being
at Princeton, Harvard or Oxford universities. Indeed,
I think that AUC ought to be proud of its younger
generation of politically and socially committed
academics I personally know, and who made a
conscious choice to return back and live in Cairo and
work there.

This said, it is no coincidence that many belonging to
our scientific community have recently felt somehow
“misused” through being overwhelmed by Western
tourist-revolutionary academics in search of
“authentic” Tahrir revolutionaries, needing “service
providers” for research assistants, for translating, and
newspaper summaries, for first hand testimonies, and
time and again as providers of experts and young
representatives for forthcoming abounding
conferences on the Arab Spring in the West.
“Cherchez”, the authentic revolutionary in each
corner of the city, is the fashionable mood of these
times. In theory, there is nothing wrong with
providing services, had the relationship been equal,
which was unfortunately never the case.
Another point of concern was made clear to me
through my ongoing dialogue with Emad Shahin who
pointed to the following issues: the level of
commitment of some Western academics to their

subject matter, and the return the region gets on the
provision of service. Many overnight Middle East
experts show a remarkable tendency to pursue
sensational and market-driven topics and readily
switch interest as the market forces fluctuate. One
day they are self-proclaimed experts on “political
Islam” or “Islam and gender” and another, they are
authority on “the Arab Spring” and “pro-democracy
revolutions”. This superficial and business-oriented
handling of crucial developments and changes in the
area affects how the peoples of the region are
perceived and how policies are shaped in the West.
Malaysian sociologist S Farid Alatas argued as he
promoted the idea of the necessity of establishing an
indigenous sociology through a modern reading of
the work of Ibn Khaldun and state formation that
such a move has to be undertaken parallel with the
rethinking of curricula and syllabi in non-Western
academic contexts. Furthermore, he argued that until
today, textbooks specialising in sociological theory
reveal a flagrant subject-object contradiction, which
has been previously highlighted in the debate on
Orientalism.
Namely, that European thinkers remain pervasively as
the “knowing subjects” whereas non-Europeans
continue to be the “objects of observations and
analyses of European theorists”. Unless these issues
are not brought up on the table of research agendas I
am afraid that much will be said in the name of the
revolution while perpetrating the same inequalities
and Orientalist attitudes that are mostly felt in the job
market, and in evaluating “whose knowledge counts
more” in academe.
* Reprinted with permission from Mona Abaza.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/22373.aspx
**Mona Abaza is a professor of sociology at the
American University in Cairo.
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Review of “Islam: To Reform or to
Subvert” by Mohammed Arkoun
(Saqi Books, 2006)
Imranali Panjwani*
Mohammed Arkoun’s “Islam: To Reform or to
Subvert” is arguably the last book of Arkoun to be
published in English before his death on September
14th 2010. His death symbolises a loss in pioneering
intellectual thought and boldness, particularly in the
field of Islamic studies and source interpretation. It is
therefore all the more significant to analyse this last
work of his which not only represents a synthesis of
his previous works (such as Rethinking Islam:
Common questions, Uncommon answers) but also
some of his lasting critical thoughts on how the
revealed and transmitted sources in Islam, namely the
Qur’an and Sunnah, should be viewed and interpreted
by scholars and believers alike.

Moreover, Arkoun daringly covers the revelation of
the Qur’an and its epistemological value and the
development of classical Islamic scholarship to the
mindset of ulama (scholars) and political approaches
to Islam in relation to the Islamic person. He is
therefore both an insider and outsider to Islamic
thought. Finally, Arkoun is neither an apologetic or
modernist — perhaps an appropriate term is a
‘criticalist’; he equally criticises Western worldviews
of Islam as well as Islamic worldviews of the West,
for example, ‘the book by Bernard Lewis, entitled
What Went Wrong?, whose phenomenal sales attests
to its mass appeal, is an excellent case in point…it
will suffice to point out that both its title and its
contents betray the intellectual impasse born of a
frame of mind intent on thinking in terms of the
polarity of an imaginary ‘Islam’ and its equally
imaginary counterpart of the ‘West.’

Any review of a book would of course cover the
author’s main themes and thoughts but I cannot start
without mentioning Arkoun’s intellectual breadth and
depth of both Western and Islamic sciences. Arkoun’s
work can be characterised as anthropological,
historical and epistemological but what is intriguing
is his attempt in traversing numerous themes,
worldviews and subjects. Arkoun appears extremely
comfortable in quoting pioneers (past and present) of
Western philosophy and Orientalism such as Weber,
Hegel, Kant, Burton, Wansbrough, Schacht and
Rubin as well as scholars of Islamic sciences such as
Shafi‛i, Khaldun and Ghazali. For anyone interested
in Shi‛i scholarship, Arkoun also mentions scholars
such as Baqir al-Sadr, Khui and Muzaffar, which
from my own personal reading is rare amongst
Islamic scholarship that generally leans toward Sunni
and/or Sufi interpretations. This in itself shows the
reader Arkoun’s intellectual and communal
awareness.
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So long as this fictional dualism remains in place, the
intellectual impasse which is thereby engendered is
destined to remain irresolvable.’(P. 10) He further
says, ‘the self-promoting West does not even
integrate in its geopolitical strategies the imposition
of its world vision and ‘universal’ values, to counter
the negative or positive perceptions other peoples and
cultures are developing towards its policy.‘(P. 117)
The book is divided into seven chapters covering the
following subjects: Qur’anic studies, belief and the
construction of the subject in Islamic contexts,
logocentrism and religious truth in Islamic thought,
authority and power, the concept of the person in
Islamic tradition, aspects of religious imaginary and
the rule of law and civil society in Muslim contexts.
The latter chapter deals with the Crusades and the
Battle of Lepanto. Arkoun’s intellectual project in this
book is to demystify and deconstruct the religious
imaginary which the majority of Islamic scholars
(and Western scholars of Islam), Shi‛a or Sunni, have
operated on for far too long and to challenge the
reader into thinking about the fundamental questions
of the purpose of revelation, its relationship to the
person and its social effects. This is not merely a
commentary on reform of Islamic thought but a bold
attempt in changing the status quo of Islamic thought
and practice – not just for a renewed interpretation
but for the very existence of humankind, which
Arkoun argues is trapped in an anthropological
triangle of ‘violence, sacred and Truth.’(P. 382)
The first issue Arkoun deals with is the ‘tele-technoscientific-reason’ of contemporary Western
intellectual thought which he calls a ‘purely
pragmatic, empiricist expertise.’(P. 37) His criticism
centres on reason as an instrumental venture yielding
only efficiency and productivity but without actually
answering the ‘unreachable mysteries of the lived
experiences of the individual.’(p. 41) The

instrumental nature of reason has been greatly
criticised by philosophers such as Charles Taylor who
in his seminal Sources of the Self states:
…much of contemporary
philosophy has ignored this dimension
of our moral consciousness and beliefs
altogether and has even seemed to
dismiss it as confused and
irrelevant...we are dealing here with
moral intuitions which are
uncommonly deep, powerful and
universal. They are so deep that we are
tempted to think of them as rooted in
instinct, in contrast to other moral
reactions which seem very much the
consequence of upbringing and
education. There seems to be a natural,
inborn compunction to inflict death or
injury on another, an inclination to
come to the help of the injured and
endangered. Culture and upbringing
may help to define the boundaries of
the relevant 'others' but they don't
seem to create the basic reaction itself.
That is why eighteenth-century
thinkers, notably Rousseau, could
believe in a natural susceptibility to
feel sympathy for others.(Taylor, Charles.
Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern
Identity (Cambridge, 2008), pp. 4-5)

Instead, Arkoun argues for ‘Emerging Reason’ which
analyzes cognitivity itself ‘so as not to repeat the
ideological compromises and derivations of the
precedent postures and performances of
reason’ (Arkoun, Mohammed. Islam: to Reform or to Subvert
(Saqi Books, 2006), p. 35) and to fully encompass the
human condition, including minority voices. At the
same time, Arkoun argues we must not be overly
certain about our religious interpretations as this leads
to irrational orthodoxy, to the detriment of the human
condition.

[31]

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
In fact, Arkoun states that even when the sciences of
usul al-din and usul al-fiqh were developed by
Muslim theologians and jurists from the 8th century
onwards, their ‘frameworks were pluralistic and
conflicting, much less monolithic than what the
fundamentalist discourse has been imposing for
several decades.’(p. 56) Moreover, he writes,
‘European modernity, at least since the eighteenth
century, has left us with the impression that reason
could finally be liberated from the constraints of
dogmatism in order to be placed in the service of
objective knowledge alone, once a radical separation
between every institutionalised religious law and the
“neutral” state has been accomplished.’ (P. 57)
Arkoun’s aim here is to revitalize Islamic thought
from its own constraints and admit that its own
epistemology was, at one time, dynamic in itself and
that ‘both trends, Shi‛a and Sunni, never paid serious
attention to the modern European development of
philosophy until the nineteenth century.’ (P. 203)
Failing to engage in this exercise leads to a problem
in narrative, i.e., the creation of idealised
circumstances, sciences and figures that were correct
and certain and which forever more will be the
continual reference point for Islamic interpretation
and belief. Arkoun’s method of problematising the
issue of certainty in reason leads him to consider how
the Qur’an was revealed and its epistemological
value today. He argues, similar to Muhammad
Shahrur, that the Qur’an started as a prophetic
discourse (not a book) between God, the Prophet
Muhammad, and the people. It was a lived faith
experience that operated not only within the milieu of
other religious traditions but, in particular, in the
same monotheistic space as Christianity and Judaism.
For Arkoun, it appears the Heavenly message, the
Book, is the ‘celestial text’ that has been revealed in
the form of books or ‘societies of the Book-book.’ (P.
81) His aim is to deconstruct the ‘revealed given’ that
‘has been received, interpreted and translated into

ethical, legalistic, political, semantic, aesthetic and
spiritual codes.’ (P. 81) In this sense, Arkoun puts the
Qur’an in a much wider epistemological framework
emanating from the same Heavenly source as other
revealed books, but which has been greatly shaped by
historical forces and needs to be viewed as a
progressive construct.
Here, Arkoun points to a gap in classical Muslim
scholarship that has continued up until today. He
states that ‘Qur’anic scholars had little regard for
questions of an epistemological nature, if they were
even aware of them at all.’ (P. 59) This is
substantiated toward the end of the book in which
Arkoun quotes from several notable scholars from the
Shi‛a and Sunni tradition (such as Khui, Khaldun and
Ghazali) who do not deal with the fundamental
questions of the Qur’anic discourse and instead treat
the Qur’an as an enclosed book, full of certainties and
capable of containing every single aspect of guidance
for human beings. For Arkoun, the same applies to
the Sunnah and the fact that this has been elevated to
a degree that can supersede even the Qur’an itself. It
is here we come to the biggest problem that Arkoun
identifies: the ‘Official Closed Corpus.’ (P. 81) This is
the corpus of books compiled in the 8th through the
10th centuries; the core books of narration and law
produced by figures not to be questioned and that
provide the base narrative of interpreting religion.
Arkoun mentions the main books of hadith of the
Shi‛a and Sunni as examples of this, but what is
intriguing is the gradual formation of imperatives and
cultural norms by classical scholars which cement
this idealised narrative, such as the trustworthiness of
key religious figures in history or the notion that the
whole umma would not agree on an error (therefore
implying their agreement must be truth). This critique
also includes the ‘most learned exegesis to daily
liturgical recitation and the spontaneous quoting of
verses or hadiths in current conversation, in
controversy or at joyful or sombre events.’ (P. 86)
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For Arkoun, the Official Closed Corpus has resulted
in the stagnation of interpreting Islamic thought and
sources for the contemporary age. This in turn has
resulted in the narrowing of classical Islamic
sciences, including theology and law. He says:
the composition, diffusion and
consecration of the written corpora
have allowed the setting up of a
supreme Instance, from which,
from every community, learned
ulama draw intangible definitions
of the ideal conduct and means of
validation and reactivation of
orthodox believing…This means
that the believing experienced
ignores the distinctions of the
historian, sociologist and
psychologist analyst between the
Qur’an as a chronological series of
oral statements, then as the
Official Closed Corpus, the
secondary corpora elaborated by
the interpreting communities for
the purpose of integrating into the
relatively open Corpus of belief
everything that appears as
innovation, heterogeneous conduct
(bid‛a) imposed by historical
evolution or socio-cultural
diversity. (P. 122)
Arkoun analyzes the epistemology and methodology
of the Official Closed Corpus by devoting a large
section to al-I’lam bi-manaqib al-islam (Exposé of
the Eminent Qualities of Islam) by Abu al-Hasan
Amiri (d. 381/992). Here, he shows the logocentrism
and use of reason in Amiri’s work, which he argues
was attempting to be dynamic in its own time and
emphasised the role of reason rather than simply
following in the footsteps of the ancients. This is a

valuable section of the book as it exposes Arkoun’s
use of case studies to cogently illustrate the kind of
argumentation used in the classical Islamic period,
which he supplements with useful diagrams.
Arkoun’s thrust here is to show how Amiri’s work
attempted to change the prevailing methodological
assumptions of the time (but also acknowledges
Amiri’s limits) and to assert that Islamic scholars
today must do the same. He states, ‘what have we
gained from our own reading of the I’lam?
Essentially, an evaluation of the practical efficacy and
theoretical inadequacy of philosophical writing in the
fourth century H./tenth century…The value of alAmiri’s demonstration resides in the solid links he
manages to establish between Revelation and
history.” (P. 199)
Arkoun then goes on to analyze authority and power
within the Islamic tradition. Fundamentally, he argues
that not only have Islamic ruling authorities stagnated
scholarship but that even ulama have failed to grasp
the ‘historical reasoning about the changing
epistemological postures of reason in each given
culture and at each stage of a long historical
development.’ (P. 205) The result is a collective
memory or imaginary in which the political and/or
scholarly ruling elite exercises power in the name of a
claimed Truth. The worst aspect is when killing
occurs with reference to holy cities that exemplify
this collective imaginary by the ruling elites, scholars
and believers alike. Examples also include the
banning of intellectuals who disagree with the
‘Iranian Republic, under the leadership of learned
authorities who monopolize control of Qur’anic
interpretation.‘ (P. 372) It is here that Arkoun deals
with the concept of the person in Islamic tradition by
examining the relationship between the ‘Qur’anic
fact’ of God conveying Himself to us and how we
must respond to Him. Both these chapters act as a
bridge between the epistemological and
methodological chapters early on in the book and
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relate on a practical level to authority, power and
personhood.
The final chapters examine the concept of a religious
imaginary using two historical case studies – the
Crusades and the Battle of Lepanto. Here, Arkoun
aims to show historical conflicts and killings that
have resulted from creating a problematic narrative of
religion. Quoting Monsignor Sabbah, Latin Patriarch
of Jerusalem, Arkoun states, ‘What gives birth to
religious extremisms and religious wars is not dogma,
but men who transform dogmas into specific cultures
and national identities. For if all the faithful limited
themselves to the effort to seek God and to adore
Him, the search for God and his adoration could not
be the causes of wars, hatred or discrimination.’ (P.
308) This leads to Arkoun’s final point in the book:
Humanity has trapped itself in an anthropological
triangle of violence, the sacred and the Truth.

is why I am defending a pluralistic, open
epistemology that goes beyond the contradictory
debates on the one-sided truth, or the right of each
individual to hold on to his ‘difference’, without
caring about the ideological dimensions implicit in
each ‘difference’, or ‘identity’ currently based on
emotional ties.’ (P. 97)
*

Imranali Panjwani is a PhD candidate in Theology
& Religious Studies, King’s College London.
jpanjwani@hotmail.com

Overall, I would argue that “Islam: to Reform or to
Subvert” is an invaluable addition to Islamic
scholarship, not least because it represents Arkoun’s
final thoughts in English before his death. The book
is a rarity and it strikes deep at the heart of the
intellectual, social and political issues facing Islamic
scholarship and Muslims. Scholars and readers alike
who are looking for an anthropological, historical and
epistemological contribution with an acute
understanding of Muslim community issues would
find this a welcome contribution, along with
Shahrur’s ‘The Qur’an, Morality and Critical
Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur.’
Arkoun’s real value in this book is his level of
analysis and scholarly breadth. He understands
Western and Muslim modes of scholarship and is not
afraid to ask the boldest of questions about the
formation and influence of religion. Perhaps this
following statement sums up his liberating and
courageous intellectual approach: ‘when confronting
each other, both sides are intellectually arrogant. That
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Professor Mohammed Arkoun
(February 1, 1928 – September 14, 2010)

SOCIOLOGY OF ISLAM &
MUSLIM SOCIETIES
Two Important News
The Sociology of Islam Journal from Brill
Reception at MESA, Washington DC (Dec. 1-4, 2011)
Dear all,
As you all know, our Sociology of Islam mailing list has grown enormously over the last few years. As of today,
we have more than 1400 scholars from 413 universities and 37 different countries with a wide range
of scholarship interests and specializations, from Sociology to International Studies, History, Political Science,
and Islamic Studies. We have published seven issues of the Sociology of Islam and Muslim Societies Newsletter
(http://pdx.edu/sociologyofislam/newsletter). The newsletter is written/created from a distinctly non-Orientalist
perspective. I must admit that we have faced some challenges from the increased trend of Islamophobia in the
academic environment in the US; however, as C Wright Mills wrote, "every time intellectuals have the chance
to speak yet do not speak, they join the forces that train men not to be able to think and imagine and feel in
morally and politically adequate ways. When they do not demand that the secrecy that makes elite decisions
absolute and unchallengeable be removed, they too are part of the passive conspiracy to kill off public scrutiny.
When they do not speak, when they do not demand, when they do not think and feel and act as intellectuals-and so as public men--they too contribute to the moral paralysis, the intellectual rigidity, that now grip both
leaders and led around the world" (The Causes of World War III, 1958, p. 134).
We are also very excited to announce that our newsletter, the Sociology of Islam and Muslim Societies will be
published by Brill (http://www.brill.nl/) as a scholarly peer reviewed journal, and in preparation for this
development, our editorial and advisory board has been updated. There are plans to publish the first issue at the
end of 2012.
Additionally, we will hold a reception for the Sociology of Islam at the upcoming MESA meeting in
Washington DC, on December 1-4, 2011. Reception details are as follows, and you will also find information
about the upcoming reception at the MESA program website: http://www.mesa.arizona.edu/.

The Sociology of Islam Social Gathering at MESA
Saturday, December 3, 2011
Social Gathering, 5-6pm, Jackson Room (Marriott)
You are all invited and we hope to see some of you there.
Salaam to all,

Tugrul Keskin
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